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Is Law Computable?: Critical Perspectives on Law and Artificial Intelligence. Edited by Simon 
Deakin and Christopher Markou. Oxford; New York: Hart Publishing, 2020. xxi, 320 pages. 
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978-1-5099-3706-6 (Hardback) $130.05. 
 
If you have any interest in artificial intelligence (AI), especially if it’s coupled with a desire to 
learn more about how developments in AI are related to law and legal technology, then this 
collection of papers has been compiled just for you. However, as Frank Pasquale1 rightly 
suggests in his thoughtful foreword, this is also “a collection that should be read by a wide range 
of audiences both in and around the legal profession” (p. v). 
 
Why such high praise? First of all, these papers were prepared for a one-day workshop2 that 
brought together “some of the most influential scholars working at the intersection of 
law/technology” (p. 19). This diverse range of experts gathered at the University of Cambridge 
in December 2019 to share their ideas and talk about how artificial intelligence, machine 
learning and data science have been and might be applied to legal procedures and decision-
making. And secondly, as stated in the concluding remarks of the editors’ introductory chapter, 
these papers are a “deliberate effort to push-back against the more hagiographical accounts of AI 
in law” (p. 28). In other words, these papers provide a much-needed critical analysis and reality 
check. 
 
While AI is mentioned regularly in media and social media sources, the general fervor over AI 
seems to have died down since IBM’s Watson won that fabled Jeopardy! tournament in 2011, or 
DeepMind’s AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol the reigning 9-dan professional Go champion 4 games to 1 
in 2016. Computational successes like these, or even the earlier Deep Blue chess program, have 
led some Legal AI proponents to “mistakenly assume that because machine learning systems can 
perform well in certain well-defined and well-delineated tasks, they are transferable … to a 
complex, shifting thing like law, filled with loosely-defined abstract concepts” (p. 119). 
 
The idea of the “legal singularity,”3 which Jennifer Cobbe describes as “the point at which 
machines become as good as if not better than humans at understanding, applying, and, 
potentially, writing the law” (p. 107), is raised and contested by many of the writers in this 
collection. Lyria Bennett Moses, for example, explains that law and legal processes are much 
more of a “multi-dimensional puzzle” (p. 205) and therefore there will not be a “single 
singularity” (p. 205-222). She also provides a particularly useful conceptualization describing 
these legal singularities as a three-dimensional solid changing over time where “each axis 
comprises legal tasks otherwise performed by human paralegals, lawyers and judges” (p. 205). 
Think of an amorphous object that expands until all aspects of this legal puzzle have reached out 
 
1 See his fantastic keynote presentation “Battle of the Experts: The Promise and Peril of Automating Knowledge 
Work” delivered at the 2021 Virtual CALL/ACBD Conference.  
2 For some additional information see https://www.jesus.cam.ac.uk/articles/lex-ex-machina-conference-laws-
computability.  
3 Alarie, Benjamin. 2016. “The Path of the Law: Toward Legal Singularity.” University of Toronto Law Journal. 66 (4): 
443–455. 
to touch an encompassing sphere that represents the perfect or “functionally complete”4 legal 
system.  
 
All contributions to this collection are well-written, impeccably researched, thought provoking 
and worth reading. In addition to the application of AI to law in general there are papers that 
focus more specifically on law and politics, law and society, the rule of law, holding AI 
criminally responsible, copyright, and assessing mental capacity.  
 
Having said that, if you could only read one of these chapters, the final chapter by Christopher 
Markou and Lily Hands would be recommended. It provides an excellent overview of the 
challenges involved when using AI as a way to assess legal capacity. It begins by considering the 
influence of early applications of AI and medicine including the development of medical expert 
systems used for psychiatric diagnosis and clinical decision support. In the process Markou and 
Hands also review various stages in AI development: Logical AI, Connectionist AI, Affective 
Computing, Automated Mental State Detection, and briefly touches on human brain interfaces.  
 
Since machines are not “capable of cognitive awareness” (p. 195) they don’t, nor can they, 
“think.”5 Therefore the idea of using a machine to assess the psychological state of a human 
being is an important legal problem to consider. Especially, as Markou and Hands explain, when 
the assessment process calls on the courts “to apply a fundamentally imprecise concept to 
subjective evidence while resolving conflicts between individual autonomy, social norms, ethics 
and public policy” (p. 279). In other words, this is not a well-defined area of law.  
 
The social role of law is often overlooked in legal AI which leads Cobbe to conclude that 
“without rethinking how law is problematized and responses developed, and without working 
towards radically rebuilding the law to try to produce a fairer, more just society, legal singularity 
as a vision and a goal remain primarily concerned with making the law better at entrenching 
market-oriented logics, commercial imperatives, and a particularly computational worldview” (p. 
133). This omission is another common thread found throughout this collection and raises 
another important question that many authors allude to: just because “arbitrary software 
developers in big tech or big law” (p. 83) can apply AI to an area of law, or indeed to any aspect 
of life, should they? 
 
From a practical perspective these papers are enhanced by a glossary and a decent index. For 
each term in the glossary, for example ‘Machine Ethics,’ a definition and a short reading list are 
provided. Very helpful for readers looking to gain a better understanding of the concepts and 
historical developments of AI and law. While AI continues to seep into many areas of legal 
practice this is an important collection of critical papers relevant not just for law libraries but for 
any library collection hoping to inform readers about ongoing developments of AI and society.  
 
4 Ibid. 
5 “Even though machines that ‘think’ is how some people have conceptualized AI, this remains a futuristic vision” 
(p. 207). 
